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Abstract Public programs to reduce the rate of coastal wetlands losses are
based upon an ambiguous policy framework. Also, scientific uncertainty about
the services of wetlands make credible economic valuation difficult, thus re-
ducing the utility of benefit-cost analysis within the wetlands regulation pro-
cess. Reform of national wetlands programs can result in enhanced mainte-
nance of wetlands stocks and accomodation of development pressures. The
policy reforms proposed in this paper will result in achievement of these ob-
jectives in an economically efficient manner.
Introduction
Only in the last three decades has it become clear that wetlands are an integral
component of the coastal marine ecosystem. The ascribed role of wetlands in the
marine environment extends beyond such obvious services as fish nursery and
habitat to the contribution of wetlands to the nutrient and energy budgets of
estuarine systems. Nevertheless, the scientific evidence on the relationship of
wetlands to environmental services is still being developed (Greeson et al. 1979).
In particular, the ability to identify the contribution of specific wetlands parcels
to the functioning of the marine ecosystem is limited. However, the general con-
tribution of wetlands systems to the natural productivity of the marine environ-
ment is seldom a matter of scientific debate.
During the same period that the scientific evidence on the ecosystem role of
wetlands was slowly accumulating, it also became evident that the nation's wet-
lands stock had been depleted by direct development on former wetlands (e.g.
San Francisco Bay) and by indirect degradation from economic development ac-
tivities. An illustration of indirect degradation is provided by the current condition
of the Louisiana coastal marsh. For thousands of years the Mississippi River has
meandered over the landscape causing bank erosion and streambed deposition
over its entire length. As a result the river has carried a heavy sediment load to
its mouth along the Louisiana coast. As the flow rate slowed near the River's
mouth, sediments were deposited and a delta was formed which developed into
extensive marshlands. The pattern of sediment delivery reached a dynamic equi-
librium with forces of subsidence and shoreline erosion; over time vast acreages
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of marsh were maintained. At the same time a mix of vegetation types emerged
and an extensive pattern of wetlands environments, ranging from saline to fresh-
water, developed (Gagliano and van Beck 1976).
Beginning in the last century, economic development began to intrude on this
hydrologic process. Upstream tributary reservoirs were constructed and served
as sediment traps; bank erosion was controlled. The result was a reduction in
sediment delivery. At the mouth of the river, navigation channel development
constricted the meandering channel and funneled sediment and freshwater far
offshore. At the same time, channels were cut through the marsh for pipelines to
carry offshore gas and oil to on-shore processing facilities. These pipeline cuts
affected the salinity regimes. Today, Louisiana wetlands are disappearing as sub-
sidence and erosion are no longer being offset by sediment deposition. As marsh
changes from fresh to saline with salt water intrusion, vegetation losses leave
marsh soils unanchored and subject to erosion (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
1984).
Until recently state and federal policy encouraged "reclamation" of wetlands
for commercial use, but during the last three decades, in response to the changing
views on the importance of wetlands, this policy position has been modified. At
all levels of government programs have been adopted to manage the rate and
location of wetlands alterations (U.S. Congress 1984). However, because sci-
entific study of the relationship of wetlands to the marine environment is a rela-
tively new endeavor, the establishment of scientifically defensible wetlands man-
agement goals and strategies of wetlands management has been difficult. In
addition, there have been cases where damages to coastal marsh have occurred
and legal actions have been taken to secure monetary compensation for such
damages. In those instances, the basis for determining how much, if any, com-
pensation is required also has been difficult.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a policy framework for coastal wetlands
management and damage assessment. Specifically, a policy based upon setting
targets for maintaining regional wetlands stocks will be described, and a man-
agement program based upon wetlands development fees and wetlands banks will
be outlined. The problem of wetlands damage assessment also will be addressed
in this management context, and a defense will be offered for using the cost of
wetlands construction and rehabilitation as a basis for setting damages. The last
section of the paper will illustrate the application of the management and damage
assessment approach for Louisiana coastal marsh.
In order to develop this policy framework we will first describe the technical
obstacles to measuring the economic value of a coastal marsh environment. The
focus will be upon the absence of scientific understanding and data suitable for
sound valuation efforts. Next we will describe the rapid evolution of the nation's
wetlands management programs. We will argue that the resulting policy has de-
veloped without a clear statement of goals and without a cost effective manage-
ment program, and, i^is in this context that our policy proposal fits.
Valuing and Managing the Undeveloped Coastal Marsh
The economic valuation of a natural wetlands can not be made by inference from
land market prices because the value of many of the service fiows will not beMitigating Damages from Wetlands Development 229
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Figure 1. Determination of unaltered wetlands value.
(I)
appropriable by the land owner. Thus valuing a marsh parcel as a physical asset
requires valuing the service vector of the marsh parcel in question and then im-
puting the value of the services to the marsh itself. The general framework for
evaluation of natural wetland areas is discussed below in the context of Figure
1.
A wetlands area can be viewed as a physical asset which functions as part of
both a hydrologic and ecologic system. In turn this functioning gives rise to at
least some ofthe following services: recreation, nutrient cycling and water quality
improvement, erosion control, and wildlife and fish habitat. The possible existence
of these services means that an economic use-value for a wetlands area may exist
if the one or more of its services is scarce. Figure 1 depicts a valuation sequence
from wetlands area (Box I) to wetlands function (Box II), to wetlands service
(Box III), to service use-value (Box IV) along linkages (a), (b) and (c). Wetlands
values in Box IV are money equivalent measures of value in terms of economic
surplus. Economic valuation of a wetlands area requires quantifying each of these
linkages.
Also depicted in Figure 1 is the possibility that substitutes may exist for a
wetlands service. Substitutes for a wetlands area (Box V) could include construc-
tion of new wetlands by whatever means are technically available. The con-
structed wetlands would be presumed to provide similar functions as the natural
area. Substitutes for wetlands hydrologic or ecologic functions (Box VI) would
include, but not be limited to, fish hatcheries, erosion control structures, and
waste-water treatment plants. Substitutes for wetlands services (Box VIII) would
include but not be limited to changes in location of economic activity to less fiood
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areas, and alternative recreational activities and sites. The linkages (a), (b), (c),
(d'), (d"), and (d'") suggest that the wetlands services available at any time and
place will depend upon the existence of natural wetlands areas and area, function
and service substitutes. Linkages (e'), (e") and (e'") suggest that the cost of wet-
lands substitution (Box VIII) depends upon the particular mix of actions taken
from Boxes V, VI, and VII.
The economic approach to valuation of a natural wetlands area follows from
application of the "with and without" principle. Specifically, to the extent that
a natural wetlands area is the only source of wetlands services, the foregone
economic value of these services (Box IV) with the change in wetlands area, as
compared to without the change, can be entirely attributed to the wetlands area
change along arrows (c), (b) and (a).' Application of the "with and without"
principle also emphasizes that the measurement of natural wetlands economic
value must consider whether wetlands substitutes exist. If substitutes do exist,
then the cost of employing substitutes to replace the wetlands service is an al-
ternative measure of value. The value of a wetlands area will be the lesser of (1)
the least cost combination of wetlands substitutes capable of providing the same
services, (Box VIII) or (2) the direct measure of service value attributable to the
area (Box IV). This is so because people would not be willing to pay for a wetlands
any more than the lesser of the value of the services it provides or the least cost
method of replacing the services by employing wetlands substitutes.
As an alternative to identifying the least cost combination of substitutes, the
physical construction of another similar wetlands area can be presumed to replace
whatever services were fiowing from the area being valued without having actual
knowledge of linkages in Figure 1. Similar structural features of the replacement
area could insure substitution of ecological and hydrological function; it then could
be presumed that the service vector of the substitute wetlands will be identical
to the service vector of the area being valued. Cost ofa wetlands area construction
can be estimated by standard engineering cost estimation methods. These cost
estimates would be an absolute maximum measure of the value of the service
vector (Box IV), and, hence, the wetlands area being replaced (Box I). This rep-
resents a maximum value measure because it will be equal to or greater than the
value of the service vector as well as equal to or greater than the least cost
combination of wetland substitutes. The standard criticism of using replacement
cost is that it can easily overstate economic surplus measures, unless there is
evidence that people would be willing to pay for the wetlands service if it were
sold at prices sufficient to cover the cost of the substitute. The fact that replace-
ment cost is an upper bound on economic value measurement is not as commonly
acknowledged.
Figure 1 makes it clear that accurate use valuation depends upon having a
credible basis for establishing linkages (a), (b), and (c). The "with versus without"
principle seeks to isolate the value of a specific marginal acre of wetlands and
makes it necessary to identify the services from a particular area. Documentation
that all wetlands on average may provide a wide array of services does not serve
This argument does not deny that small reductions in wetlands acreage over time may
result in loss of a service if the cumulative losses reduce wetlands acreage to below some
threshold level needed to maintain the service level. At this point positive marginal values
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to establish marginal values for specific land parcels. Site-specific analysis is
needed for at least three reasons. First, a wetlands may provide a service, but if
there is no economic demand no value will be lost if the wetlands area is devel-
oped. Second, not all wetlands areas are equally capable of providing a given
vector of wetlands services. Third, to observe that a service exists with the wet-
lands area does not logically permit the analyst to conclude that the service will
cease to exist without the wetlands area. For example, a particular commercial
fish harvest level which exists with a wetlands area may not change when the
wetlands are developed, if changes in fish populations with the wetlands alteration
are too small to affect harvest. There is also a need for function and service
assessment analysis to be able to specify whether substitutes are able to produce
the same services as the wetlands area being valued—linkages (e') (e") (e'"). Since
all wetlands are not of equal productivity, the needed detailed, parcel level, as-
sessment analysis will be both time consuming and costly. These assessment needs
will stretch the ability of wetlands scientists to make scientifically defensible
claims about the services of any given wetlands in the larger marine environment
(Kusler 1986).
Oviatt et al. (1977, p. 211) after reviewing the knowledge of ecosystems func-
tions and services of coastal marsh in Rhode Island discuss the difficulties of
wetlands assessment. They state that "development of ecological rating systems
for coastal wetlands must be viewed with considerable skepticism, for there is
little reason to believe that such systems can be established on sound scientific
ground. ..." It (wetlands management) should not be made on the basis of an
elaborate rating scheme that is, in fact, built on a very shaky intellectual foun-
dation. It is a great disservice to pretend to so much certainty when we are still
far from knowing what is happening in the wetlands. Of course, application of
the full menu of economic valuation techniques in individual cases also will require
substantial analytical cost and time requirements, especially as more complex
theoretical considerations must be addressed. These cost and time requirements
mean that for numerous small wetlands areas, credible valuation of services will
be infeasible.
Despite these measurement difficulties, a perception persists among econo-
mists and others, that it is necessary to ascribe economic values to individual
wetlands areas. Such a perception persists within the economics discipline be-
cause of the strong orientation to the economic efficiency perspective on resource
allocation which presumes that decision making proceeds only by analysis of
marginal benefits and costs over a continuing sequence of decisions. However,
there are other opportunities for economic analysts to serve wetlands policy and
management. The nature of this alternative economic contribution is discussed
in detail after a brief review of current wetlands programs.
The Wetlands Policy Context
The nation has no explicit policy of wetlands protection. Rather wetlands policies
and programs are the product of a diffuse and evolutionary process that strongly
implies favoring wetlands protection over wetlands alterations. The rate of wet-
lands alteration has slowed substantially during the last two decades, but the losses
each year remain substantial (U.S. Congress 1984). In part these losses are the232 Leonard A. Shabman and Sandra S. Batie
result of a continuing effect from previous wetlands destruction (such as that
affecting the Louisiana coast), where there is not an explicit program for resto-
ration. At the same time, wetlands regulation which proceeds on a case by case
basis has been conducted in a diffused and contradictory regulatory environment.
In a recent speech, Milton Russell, Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning
and Evaluation at the EPA, summarized the situation by noting that "our current
wetland policy is confused and often inadvertently destructive" (1986, p. 8). Such
a conclusion is consistent with the findings of other studies (U.S. Congress 1984).
It is instructive to review briefly how the national policy developed and to
note its fundamental differences with other environmental programs. In the late
1960s a series of court interpretations of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act required
that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers expand their review of dredge and fill
permit applications to include not only obstructions to navigation, but also the
effects of fill activities on wildlife habitat. This judicial action was intended to
bring the Corps' permitting program into compliance with the requirements of the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 (EWCA). However, the FWCA re-
quired that the habitat effects only be considered in decision making; there was
no mandate to protect habitat.
Questions which arose immediately were whether the limited jurisdiction of
the Corps' permit program, to the navigable waters of the United States, included
wetlands adjacent to all water bodies. Another matter in need of interpretation
was whether the effects on habitat were to be only at the site or were also to
include possible indirect effects of filling activity. The passage of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 served to expand the required review
of permits to environmental concerns beyond wildlife habitat, if such a permit
was deemed to be a "significant" federal action. However, NEPA, like the
FWCA, only required that consideration be given to environmental impacts and
carried no substantive statement of environmental requirements.
Although legislative action to clarify the national policy to wetlands devel-
opment would have been desirable, the actions of the Congress in the 1972 amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) did not clarify wet-
lands policy; yet it is Section 404 of the Act which is the basis for the existing
federal wetlands program, and the starting point for many state programs. In
Section 404 the Congress expanded the Corps' permit authority to require that
permits be denied when permitted activities would adversely affect either navi-
gation (under the 1899 Act) or water quality standards as established in compliance
with the FWPCA of 1972. (There were some exceptions to the scope of this
regulatory authority.) Proponents of wetlands protection subsequently filed a se-
ries of court cases to argue that there was a demonstrable link between wetlands
and adjacent water quality and that, therefore, it was the intent of the Congress
in framing Section 404 that the Corps be responsible for review of proposed de-
velopment in all wetlands. At the same time the NEPA process and the FWCA
requirements remained in effect, and the conclusion often was made that an overall
federal wetlands protection strategy had been pieced together.
However, there was no concurrence among the federal agencies, among the
states, or within the larger public that Section 404 was intended as a wetlands
protection program. For example, the Congress left unaddressed issues of juris-
diction—e.g. which wetlands are part of the navigable waters and whether indirect
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a debate over whether it is only the direct water quality effects of wetlands filling
which are covered by Section 404.
Wetlands protection efforts can be considered as analogous to the manner in
which wilderness and national park policy is made without any definition of stan-
dards to be achieved; in that regard wetlands protection efforts are unlike water
quality management which is directed by stream and effluent standards. Although
this discussion has focused upon the federal wetlands policy issues, the problems
in the states were similar ones, and legal indeterminancy and scientific uncertainty
have resulted in a variety of different approaches to wetlands management. The
result of the national process leading to the current wetlands policy setting is that
most attention has been paid to regulatory tactics both by those who wish to
restrict wetlands alternations and by those who feel some wetlands conversions
should be accommodated. A discussion of the twists and turns of this process,
usually in the courts, would be interesting but not germane. What has been missing
is a clear statement of goals and standards for wetlands regulation to give a larger
context to the regulatory framework.
Regulatory critics have argued (with justification) that, at times. Section 404
regulation has been unresponsive to cost considerations and often inflexible even
when those who wish to develop wetlands offered compensation (U.S. Congress
1984). Without a more complete statement of the purposes of the wetlands reg-
ulation it is unlikely that these objections to current regulatory efforts will be
overcome.
In part the regulatory dilemma has been a product of the fundamentally weak
scientific understanding of wetlands relationship to water quality and other en-
vironmental services. Denial of a wetlands development proposal requires the
permit agency to demonstrate the negative effect such development would have
on water quality. If the agency wished to consider other possible environmental
values, there was an equally weak scientific basis for linking a particular wetlands
permit to the larger environment. As Milton Russell (1986, p. 9) noted, "It would
be easier if we know more. If the various wetlands ecologies were really under-
stood, we could make intelligent defensible resource decisions."
In addition to the regulatory management problem has been the problem of
assessing damages to wetlands. As awareness of the importance of natural en-
vironments has increased, there has been a number of court cases seeking com-
pensation for damage to natural environments, including coastal wetlands. In one
case, the defendants were the owners of the S S Zoe Colocotroni, a tramp oil
tanker which ran aground off Puerto Rico in 1973. In order to refioat the ship,
the captain jettisoned over 1.5 million gallons of crude oil. The oil came ashore
in the Puerto Rican bay of Bahia Sucia where, despite cleanup efforts, there was
substantial damage to benthic and intertidal organisms and mangroves. The Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico and the Environmental Quality Board sued for damages
(Commonwealth 1980). The court, after hearing various competing views on the
calculation of damages, awarded the plaintiffs $6.2 million. This damage was
determined by estimating that there had been a decline of 4.6 million organisms
per acre due to the oil spill; then, a price of 6 cents per organism charged by
biological supply laboratories was used to compute an organism replacement cost
of $5.5 million. The judge then added to this figure the costs of replanting 23 acres
of mangroves and the cost of oil cleanup to derive the $6.2 million total. This
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of damages by use of prices from biological catalogs. The higher court concluded
with respect to estimating damages that.
To say the law on this question is unsettled is vastly to understate the
situation ... we ... have ventured far into uncharted waters. . . (and
cannot) . . . anticipate where the journey will take us (Commonwealth
1980, p. 46).
The case was remanded to the original court with the suggestion that the plaintiffs
may wish to consider such items as alternative site restoration in computing money
damages.
The 5. S. Zoe Colocotroni case used the principle of replacement cost but the
application was found inappropriate. In this case, one measure of damages was
the cost of replacing one service (organisms) rather than the physical system that
supported the organisms. It is extremely doubtful that society would demand the
organisms, if available, at $5.5 million, or that such a replacement was a least
cost alternative. Indeed the higher court recognized these problems when they
stated that awarding actual wetlands restoration costs is
a far different matter from permitting the state to recover money dam-
ages for the loss of small, commercially valueless creatures which as-
sertly would perish if returned to oil-soaked sands, yet probably would
replenish themselves naturally if and when restoration—either artificial
or natural—took place (Commonwealth 1980).
Recently, another case focused, in part, on wetlands damage. In 1979, Lou-
isiana placed a "first use tax" on natural gas which was pumped off-shore but
which was "first" processed in Louisiana before being transported to out-of-state
markets (Dakin 1978). Louisiana claimed that the natural gas processing and trans-
portation facilities had caused severe damage to approximately 10,000 acres of
the state's coastal wetlands and that the tax proceeds were designated to restore
and maintain the wetlands.
It was on this basis that Louisiana claimed that tax collections of $264 million
per year were "fairly related" to wetlands damages. The states of Maryland,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Rhode Island, and Wis-
consin sued to stop the tax from being implemented. As one argument in the case,
the plaintiffs claimed the tax levy exceeded environmental damages.
While it was relatively easy to establish that some wetlands damage had oc-
curred—particularly due to pipeline placement and right-of-way maintenance—
the question of assigning damages for establishing the tax was an important basis
for the court challenge. On June 15, 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
the Louisiana "first use" tax as unconstitutional and ordered all previously col-
lected taxes refunded with interest; however, the decision was not based upon a
consideration of whether the tax was fairly related to environmental damages.
Therefore, the basic question of assigning damages remains an open one for future
cases.
Toward a Rationalized Wetlands Policy
Given the current state of wetlands science and national wetlands policy, what
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elsewhere that the poor current understanding of wetlands asset values makes a
case for a policy bias favoring wetlands preservation unless the costs of such a
bias are unacceptably large in any specific instance (Shabman, Batie, and Mabbs-
Zeno 1979; Shabman and Bertelson 1979). We also would argue that a policy
based upon a benefit-cost balancing test for wetlands permitting is technically
impractical. However, there is sufficient evidence that, despite the ambiguity of
many aspects of wetlands policy, there has been a national shift from viewing
wetlands as wastelands to viewing wetlands as national assets in need of protec-
tion. The shift in viewpoint is a refiection of fundamental realignments of the
recognized implicit and explicit property claims to use of these areas. These re-
alignments are away from solely private discretion in determining the fate of a
land parcel to a sharing of that decision with regulatory authorities. Therefore the
economic policy question of interest is not whether wetlands should be preserved
but rather over what the most efficient manner to achieve that goal. Milton Russell
(1986) summarized his views on this argument by concluding
a responsible position, it seems to me, is to avoid casual, uncaring
destruction. It is to raise the 'hurdle' over which those who want to
convert or otherwise damage wetlands must jump. In time research
may show that these hurdles can be lowered. But unless we set them
high now, wetlands research will be of merely academic interest . . .
(p. 10)
Economic analysis in this problem context will contribute to the establishment
of required wetlands protection goals and design of institutional reforms able to
achieve that goal at least cost. This analytical perspective is the same as that
which underlies applied environmental economists' arguments in support of ef-
fluent taxes and transferable pollution rights (TPR). There is a potential to transfer
the logic of those proposals from their typical application for water and air quality
management to wetlands management. In order to make the rationale for this
transfer more clear, it is necessary to reflect briefly upon how, for example, an
effluent tax system is supposed to work.
In the effluent tax system the policy decision is divided into two separate parts
(although over time the two parts become interdependent). In the first part, an
ambient environmental goal is established for a particular area such as a river
segment. The ambient goal is in turn translated into a maximum allowable waste
discharge to the area so that realized environmental quality will remain within
the stated goal. While economic benefit analysis may be a part of the process
which defines the goal, the benefit analysis is not expected to be a definitive guide.
With an ambient goal established, the second aspect of the policy is to design
an institution to allocate waste reduction requirements such that the marginal cost
of waste withholding is equated across all waste dischargers. In the effluent tax
system, the price is set administratively to achieve this marginal cost pricing rule.
At the same time, the effluent tax reflects the marginal cost of waste withholding
for the last firm which chooses to pay the tax.
For purposes of this argument, it is worth considering the economic impli-
cations of this approach in more detail. Specifically, the effluent tax is equal to
the marginal cost each party bears to maintain the ambient standard. Stated dif-
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increase in discharge at one point by a reduction at another in order to maintain
the ambient standard; the effluent tax is equal to the cost of one party replacing
another's waste withholding effort. As long as the cost for treating the waste rather
than forgoing output or changing production practices is the waste withholding
cost, then a measurement of the marginal cost of waste treatment is a sound basis
for setting the initial effluent fee. In any event, this is the recommended approach
for setting an initial fee (Kneese and Bower 1968). In short, replacement cost is
the accepted basis for establishing a practical effluent tax scheme.
There are a number of practical reasons to build a wetlands policy on a re-
placement cost basis, in addition to the analogy to the typical effiuent tax proposals
favored in applied environmental economics studies. The cost of physical re-
placement or restoration of one wetlands area is an especially promising approach
for use in this context because such activities can be presumed to replace whatever
services were flowing from a wetlands area which was developed, without having
actual knowledge of linkage (a) in Figure 1. The biological assessment process
need only determine the structural features of the wetlands area to be replaced
as a basis for insuring physical replacement of those features. Then, it can be
presumed that the service vector of the replacement wetlands will be identical to
the service vector of the replaced area. However, the service vector itself (Box
III, in Figure 1) need not be known. Costs of wetlands replacement or restoration
would be estimated from standard engineering cost estimation methods.
Wetlands management should be targeted to an eco-region (Cowardin, et al.
1979) much as water quality management can only be pursued in a specific wa-
tershed context. Some adjustments to the eco-region boundries may be needed
to reconcile them with political jurisdictions that would have legal authority to
implement the policy. However, the possibility of demonstrating conclusively the
relationship of individual wetlands parcels to the larger eco-region is limited at
best. As a result, wetland policy reform must begin by initiating a process of goal
setting for maintenance of minimum wetlands stocks of various types within de-
fined eco-regions. In principle all wetlands may be replaceable; however, certain
areas would no doubt be reserved from development (e.g. "wetlands wilderness
areas") in the setting of a wetlands policy (Clark 1986). Given the historical loss
rate of wetlands, and the continuing scientific uncertainty about their relationship
to the larger ecosystem, a bias toward preservation of something close to the
present wetlands stocks seems warranted. To quote Milton Russell again,
there is not enough known to do that [set a wetland stock goal], it
strikes me that the only sensible policy is to start pushing harder on
the brakes, wherever wetlands are threatened, (p. 10)
This recommendation to begin by goal setting is made neither casually nor
naively. The costs of developing the information base needed to inventory wet-
lands and to map their location will be substantial. However, such an effort has
been underway for a number of years within the Fish and Wildlife Service. In
addition, the maintenance goal will not be expected to be static over time, but
rather would respond to new scientific information on wetlands and to recognition
of the actual replacement costs of maintaining a goal (actual replacement costs
are discussed in detail below). Such a dynamic approach to goal setting is de-
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making where neither technical nor value information is ever fully attainable. A
start on this goal setting process was a key recommendation of a recent OTA
report. That report called for developing an approach to wetlands management
based upon regionally established priorities for protecting wetlands" (Barnard et
al. 1985, p. 1052).
Wherever wetlands can be created and restored, it would be possible to permit
actions which destroy wetlands as long as offsetting actions are taken to rees-
tablish a wetlands at another location in order to maintain the wetlands stock.
This is the logic behind using effluent fees and TPR systems to maintain an ambient
environmental standard. The replacement action may be taken by the wetlands
developer as part of the regulatory agreement which yields the permit. Replace-
ment may be by purchase and preservation of wetlands which would otherwise
be lost to development or by construction/rehabilitation of another wetlands area.
In fact, such mitigation requirements are occasionally made a condition of wet-
lands conversion permits. Recently, some large corporations have proposed that
developers, or a group of developers, set aside wetlands areas and establish new
areas that would serve as "wetlands banks." These credits for wetlands creation
could be drawn upon in instances where wetlands were destroyed as part of their
commercial development activities (Dunham 1986). Admittedly, this "economic
incentive" approach remains an unusual recommendation, as most policy reform
proposals still stress modifications to standard regulatory permit review (Barnard
et al. 1985).
An extension of this concept is to allow the developer to make a money pay-
ment to the permitting agency, and the agency would then use such money for
wetlands replacement. The agency could collect wetlands conversion fees and,
when revenues were sufficient, could initiate a wetlands construction/restoration
project. Alternatively the agency could construct wetlands and then collect fees
to recover costs. Such a development fee ideally would be set equal to the marginal
cost of wetlands replacement. The fee system may be especially attractive if there
exist scale economies in wetlands construction which can only be realized by the
management agency and/or if the technical success of wetlands creation efforts
is enhanced by the scientific expertise available at the management agency. Thus,
the second aspect of a wetlands policy reform is to establish a system of fees
based upon replacement cost of wetlands services in conjunction with a full mit-
igation requirement for all wetlands development proposals. As long as the entity
causing the damage either provides in kind compensation or pays the fee, the
proposed development should proceed. The regulatory problem, once goals are
established, becomes one of insuring that the mitigation provisions are in place,
rather than one of trying to assess the benefits and costs of each individual permit
prior to making a decision. In this way, the proponents of the development face
an opportunity cost based upon a specified and well articulated wetlands policy,
and they can choose to individually make the adjustments in their development
plan which are most appropriate to their own situation.
A simple approach to such a fee system has been put in place by the California
Coastal Conservancy. The Conservancy has operated for over a decade with the
purpose of restoring degraded ecosystems, including wetlands. Toward that end
a number of mitigation banks have been established so that design and operation
of mitigation plans is done by resource agency professionals and to capture scale
economies. Once the mitigation bank is established applicants for wetlands de-238 Leonard A. Shabman and Sandra S. Batie
velopment permits are assessed mitigation fees which are tied to costs of estab-
lishing the mitigation hank (Riddle and Denninger 1986). This instance offers an
example of this fee-based approach to wetlands management. This policy ap-
proach also provides a context for establishing charges for damages to coastal
marsh. With the replacement cost policy in place and estimates of replacement
cost fees set, there is a basis for charges to be assigned for assessing damages to
coastal marsh. To the extent that it can be demonstrated that only a partial loss
of wetlands services has been caused (e.g. short term chemical contamination),
then the replacement cost fee would be an upper limit on the damage assessment.
In establishing a wetlands policy on a replacement cost foundation it must be
established that wetlands are replaceable either by restoration efforts or hy the
creation of new wetlands. Indeed, the evidence is accumulating that wetlands
construction and replacement is a technically achievable practice that should he
integrated into any wetlands management program. The feasibility of wetlands
construction and rehabilitation has been a subject of recent research and practical
experimentation. Preliminary investigation of marsh creation in coastal areas sug-
gests that constructed marsh areas offer many of the same services as natural
marsh after one to three years (Saucier 1978). Ashe (1982) argues that restoration
of previously altered areas may be a more feasible and suitable means of main-
taining a wetlands base than new wetlands construction. Areas physically altered
in the past are easily identified and may only require minor amount of remedial
engineering activity to restore wetlands functions and services.
Nevertheless, it would he misleading to suggest that there is a uniformity of
professional opinion about the possibility for successful wetlands construction
and rehabilitation. For example, in November of 1986 a national conference was
held solely to review the current knowledge base for wetlands mitigation (As-
sociation of State Wetland Managers). There are several concerns which arise
when the possibility of wetlands replacement is discussed. Each of these concerns
is noted below with a comment on the nature of the concern.
First, it may be argued that it is physically impossible to recreate certain
wetlands types at certain geographic locations. If this is true then a management
strategy should consider reserving those areas for special attention, and, to the
extent possible, protecting them from development pressures. Second, the ar-
gument is made that we do not yet know enough about the technical aspects of
wetlands replacement (Race 1985). This may suggest a continuing research effort;
however, realistically it is never possible to know everything prior to any policy
decision, but initiating a policy to focus on replacement can encourage continued
research. Third, the concern is expressed that the replacement cost approach will
encourage a more lenient regulatory program and accelerate wetlands loss. This
argument is a speculative one, but the presumption is that current programs have
reduced losses to acceptable levels. However, concern over loss rates continues.
The replacement cost approach is targeted to maintaining wetlands stocks as a
policy objective—an objective which is missing from the current regulatory strat-
egy. Fourth, it is noted that past wetlands replacement efforts have failed because
the replacement wetlands area was poorly managed (Race 1985). Recognition of
this problem provides the logic for having a policy which encourages wetlands
management by an agency with the necessary expertise; it is not a reasonable
critique of the wetlands replacement principle. Fifth, the objection is offered that
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mix of technical and value arguments. The evidence for this argument is yet to
be provided; however, it is the case that many of today's coastal wetlands en-
vironments are the products of man—such as the South Carolina wetlands which
were developed for rice production over 200 years ago.
The point of the above comments is not to diminish the importance of the
arguments against replacement potential as the basis for a compensation based
wetlands management program. However, the objections are not convincing evi-
dence for totally rejecting the approach, but rather they offer cautions to be heeded
in developing a replacement based management program.
Estimation and Application of the Replacement Cost Approach: The
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands
The purpose of this section of the paper is to illustrate the calculation of replace-
ment cost for one area—the Louisiana coastal marsh. In different areas of the
nation different restoration and replacement materials may be applied but the
general approach to cost estimation discussed below would be applicable. There
are three general techniques for the manmade creation of wetlands in Louisiana.
These are the controlled placement of dredge materials, controlled diversion, and
uncontrolled diversion. All attempt to duplicate, in some sense, the natural pro-
cesses that have continued for eons—with sediment laden rivers providing the
material for wetlands creation. It is only recently that the construction of dikes,
dams, and navigation channels have either trapped sediment before it reaches the
mouth of the river or which funnelled the sediment past the delta area to the deep
waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Material dredged from navigation channels or sed-
iment rich areas can be pumped into shallow water to create wetlands. Use of
dredge material also assists in what otherwise would be a disposal problem, since
over 60 million cubic yards (cy) of sediment are excavated annually in the Army
Corps of Engineers New Orleans maintenance dredging program. Furthermore,
dredge disposal allows for increased flexibility in placement of the wetlands.
Whereas diversions limit wetlands creation to near the river channel, dredge ma-
terial can be placed in locations somewhat removed from the main river channel.
Unconsolidated dredge material is placed so that, when it consolidates, the wet-
lands will be at the intertidal level (Landin 1986). Since 1970, over 15,000 acres
of wetlands have been created from dredged material in Southern Louisiana. Most
of this has been at Southwest Pass and the delta of the Mississippi. Over 4000
acres have also been built using dredged material in the Atchafalaya Basin and
other parts of the Louisiana Coast (Landin 1986).
Controlled diversions involve building a structure into the river levee to pro-
vide for the controlled release of water through the structure into an area deemed
suitable for wetlands creation. The controlled diversion could be by gravity flow
structure, siphons, or pumping stations. The diversion of the flow of the river to
restore and to create wetlands has been considered and/or accomplished by the
Corps of Engineers and the State of Louisiana (Gagliano and van Beck 1976). For
example, the Violet Siphon Structure was completed in December 1979 in Lou-
isiana's St. Bernard Parish. It consists of two 50 inch diameter pipes which divert
a maximum of 250 cfs of Mississippi flow into wetlands lying behind the Missis-
sippi River and Lake Borge. This flow diversion carries sediment which nourishes
existing wetlands and builds new wetlands.240 Leonard A. Shabman and Sandra S. Batie
Another technique used for wetlands construction is uncontrolled diversions.
These are similar to controlled diversions except that the breach in the levee does
not include a control structure. Rather, an artificial crevasse simply diverts some
of the river. Since uncontrolled diversion can mean major amounts of river flow
through the crevasse during flooding, this technique would only be acceptable
well into the delta area, below any population centers.
The placement of dredge material and the diversion of sediment-bearing waters
to build wetlands can be considered as a replacement for wetlands destroyed by
economic development activities. Therefore, the costs of constructing new wet-
lands can be used to develop a wetlands management program within an eco-
region such as the Louisiana Gulf Coast.
However, computation of the cost of a man-made wetlands area (i.e. a natural
wetlands substitute) requires more than simply reporting the engineering cost
estimates. This is the case because constructed wetlands may require the passage
of time before they can provide the same service level as the natural wetlands
area. Landin (1986), for example, estimates that it may require three to five years
for a site in south Louisiana to appear as a natural wetlands; soil profiles and root
biomass do not equal that of a natural wetlands until closer to ten years. However,
Landin (1986) further notes that once a wetlands has stabilized—anywhere from
three to ten years—there appears, based on monitoring to date, to be no difference
between a manmade and a natural wetlands. Also, engineering costs may include
a high initial capital cost component followed by low annual costs over time.
Thus, the computation of replacement costs requires appropriate adjustments to
account for time dimensions of replacement activities.
Because the time paths of costs and wetlands area replacement may differ,
the analytical problem is to determine the annual equivalent costs of replacement
(R). The value of R which just equals engineering costs incurred for the years
during which wetlands replacement actually is accomplished, and which includes
the time value of money, is the annualized replacement cost per acre. R can be
solved for in Equation (1). Note that R is expressed in annual equivalent terms.
This annual expression of costs would be the basis for a development fee system.
0 = Rt c, .?,"'"" »•",?, (.. (1)
where
T = time period of analysis
t = year
n = year in which substitute provides wetlands service
R = equivalent annual replacement cost of service flow from created wet-
lands area
i = discount rate
K = costs incurred before substitute begins providing wetlands service (pri-
marily capital costs)
C = recurring annual costs to keep wetlands substitute operating and
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In this equation, the present value of the annualized replacement cost of wetlands
services is shown as the expression in the first set of brackets. The second set
of brackets is the actual expenditures for the wetlands substitute. Solving the
equation for R yields the equivalent annual replacement cost of the wetlands area.
The general formula expressed above assumes that there are no transitional phases
of wetlands development where partial replacement has been achieved. However,
the formula can be easily amended to include such transitional periods.
In the following sections, we use actual estimates of the variables for calcu-
lating replacement cost in Louisiana Case Studies (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
1984). The estimates consider three techniques: placement of dredge material,
controlled diversions, and uncontrolled diversions. Placement of dredge material
offers the greater flexibility in both location and number of wetlands created and
therefore will be discussed first. However, the estimates are based on initial en-
gineering evaluations. If a wetlands policy were to be designed based on annu-
alized replacement costs, then further refinements in the cost estimates would be
necessary.
Controlled Placement of Dredge Material
The use of dredge material for wetland creation would be a favored technique in
Louisiana because it is lower cost than other techniques and because it provides
an opportunity to use dredge material in a beneficial way. Since the erosion and
subsidence of the Louisiana coast is so evident, there is little public opposition
to dredge material placement to create wetlands (Landin 1986).
Table 1 displays estimates of the amount of wetlands creation possible per
year at 14 different navigation project sites. The Corps of Engineers (1984) es-
timates that the incremental costs of dredging followed by material placement
over side costing the material, range from $.22 to $.57/cy depending mainly on
dredge material transport costs. Column 1 of Table 1 shows the amount of dredged
material that could be annually used to create the wetlands. The acres of created
wetlands per year at each site is indicated in column 2. The total number of
wetlands created after 50 years is displayed in column 3. Eor example, at the
Cameron site, over a 50 year period 6750 acres of wetlands at an initial construc-
tion cost are displayed in Table 2; at the Cameron site these construction costs
are $10,348,000 (Column 1) with an average annual maintenance cost of $207,000
(Column 2). Data shown in Tables 1 and 2 were taken from Corps reports. Table
2 also displays estimated annual replacement costs per acre, from application of
Equation 1, with 10 or 5 percent discount rates. Per acre annualized replacement
costs range from $216 to $901 at the 5% discount rate; at the 10% rate these costs
more than double.
Controlled Diversion
Table 3 describes seven sites on the Mississippi River where controlled diversions
have been studied. At each site, it was estimated that 320 acres of wetlands per
year for seven years (yielding 2240 acres at each site) could be created by con-
trolled diversion of 25,000 cfs of river flow; construction costs for each site are
displayed in Table 4, column 1. Construction is expected to take two years to242 Leonard A. Shabman and Sandra S. Batie
Table 1






























































































complete. Operation, maintenance, and replacement costs were estimated to be
4 percent of construction cost per year. The time horizon for the analysis is 50
years although wetlands creation ceases at the end of the seventh year after project
construction is complete. When the formula above is modified to account for the
partial replacement of wetlands through year 7, the annual equivalent replacement
cost of the wetlands can be determined for the seven sites. These costs are dis-Mitigating Damages from Wetlands Development 243
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* Modified from Watson (1984)
played in Table 4, columns (2) and (3). The difference in the estimates arise from
the choice of discount rate: 10 or 5 percent.
Uncontrolled Diversion
Uncontrolled diversions in Louisiana would involve breaching a mainline levee
with cuts varying from 50 to 200 feet wide (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1984).
These cuts imitate the natural process of river crevasse and overflow. Sediments
from crevasses are deposited in low-lying areas in deltaic splays. As the delta
matures the rate of wetlands created decreases over time.Mitigating Damages from Wetlands Development 245
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Modified from Watson (1984)
Tables 5 and 6 display areas where potential wetlands creation with uncon-
trolled sediment diversions have been studied. Over the first two years, a total
of 420 acres of wetlands would be created at the five sites; over 50 years 5245
acres will be created. The cuts have to be reopened and extended or relocated
every two to three years to maintain the rate of wetlands rate building (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers 1984). In the case of uncontrolled diversions, annualized re-
placement cost per acre when estimated at a 5 percent discount rate is $265.46.
The cost of various methods available to create and restore Louisiana wetlands246 Leonard A. Shabman and Sandra S. Batie
Table 5
Wetlands Creations with Uncontrolled Sediment Diversions*
Site Location
Site 1
Octave Pass, South Bank
Site
Raphael Pass, North Bank
Site 3
Pass a Loutre, North Bank
Site 4
Pass a Loutre, South Bank
Site 5























* Modified from Watson (1984)
can be established and made part of a region-wide wetlands management strategy.
It is necessary to emphasize that the estimates are derived from data which are
first approximations form a Corps of Engineers planning study. For example,
costs of sediment placement are sensitive to transportation distances. Nonethe-
less, the results will illustrate the appropriate approach to replacement cost cal-
culations. These calculations can be treated as an annual fee that would be col-
lected from a wetlands developer. Alternatively, the developer may choose to
Table 6
Costs of Wetlands Creations with Uncontrolled Sediment Diversions for Site
Locations 1-5*
_
Total Construction Cost ($000) 6,240,000
Average annual Maintenance Costs 124,800
Annualized Replacement Cost/Acre of Wetlands (10% discount 596.82
rate)
Annualized Replacement Cost/Acre of Wetlands (5% discount 265.46
rate)
* No individual site estimates are available as reference documents only provided total
figures. Modified from Watson (1984).Mitigating Damages from Wetlands Development 247
pay a fixed sum "up-front," with the sum equal to the present value of the annual
replacement cost stream.
Summary
During the past decade federal and state government regulation has sought to
reduce the rate of coastal wetlands development. However, it is uncertain whether
these programs can secure mitigation of damages caused by future development.
Revision of coastal wetlands management programs is needed and should involve
several actions. First, for regions of concern, wetlands acreage targets would be
set; no such targets now guide wetlands regulation programs. As a part of this
effort certain areas or types of wetlands might be protected from development.
Then, in areas not protected, development would be permitted if the developer
paid a fixed wetlands development fee which was set in relation to cost of wetlands
replacement. The realized development tax revenues would be used to finance a
region-wide investment program which can realize scale economies in replacing
and managing wetlands created to offset losses to development. The case illus-
tration provided for the Louisiana area indicates that annualized replacement costs
can be readily computed for various wetlands creation techniques. Alternatively,
the developer may choose to implement his own mitigation plan. This approach
to wetlands management offers more assurance that coastal wetlands damage will
be compensated, provides for a more certain regulatory environment for coastal
development planning, and provides a policy-relevant context for coastal wetlands
damage assessment.
These annualized replacement costs can be thought of as the amount of annual
fee that would be collected from a permittee if the fee were based on wetlands
replacement cost. While the annualized replacement costs may seem high, con-
sider that, in the first use tax case in Louisiana, state officials were collecting
$264 million a year as "fairly related" compensation to wetlands damaged. Use
of the expensive method of controlled diversions to replace the 10,000 acres of
damaged wetlands would result in average annual payments from oil and gas
producers of only $10.7 million at a 5% discount rate. This is not an overly large
amount considering the gross returns from oil and gas field development and much
less than $264 million sought by Louisiana.
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